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Abstract 
(English) 
Why and how do norms emerge? Which norms do emerge and why these ones in particular? 
These questions belong to the “problem of the emergence of norms” that consists of an inquiry 
on the production of norms in social collectives. It is with the ethnographic study of the 
emergence of “norms against violence” in the political collective “Occupy Geneva” that I 
address this problem: first, empirically with the analysis of my field observations; and, second, 
theoretically by discussing my findings. In consequence of two episodes categorized as sexual 
assaults that occurred in their camp, the members of Occupy Geneva decided to tackle those 
issues in a general assembly. Their goal was to amend their first charter of good conduct, in 
order to reform its norms and complete it with norms aiming to regulate “facts” of “unjustified 
violence.” During a collective deliberation, new norms were devised, debated, and consensually 
adopted. The writing of the new charter took place in a second general assembly during which 
the wording of the written norms was collectively decided. I show that indignation against the 
sexual assaults was the main motive that led to the collective deliberation, and that the entire 
process of the making of these norms was characterized by different collective emotions. 
Indeed, indignation, contempt and fear played major roles in the emergence of norms 
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prohibiting violence, allowing punishing and excluding wrongdoers, and prescribing to 
intervene collectively against an aggressor to neutralize the threat that he represents. These 
findings make me hypothesized that social norms emerge from emotions thanks to the latter 
internal structure; and that emotions provide causal and grounding explanations of this 
emergence. Thus, emotions allow answering the questions “Why do norms emerge?” and “Why 
do they have their specific forms?”. In short, I argue that social norms have emotional 
foundations. 
 
Keywords: emergence of social norms, emotions, indignation and punishment, contempt and 
social exclusion, fear and protection, emotion rules, causal explanation, grounding explanation, 
collective deliberation, social movements, Occupy movement 
 
Abstract 
(français) 
 
Pourquoi et comment les normes émergent-elles ? Quelles sont les normes qui émergent et 
pourquoi celles-ci en particulier? Ces questions relèvent du « problème de l’émergence des 
normes » qui consistent en une enquête sur la production des normes dans les collectifs sociaux. 
C’est par l’étude ethnographique de l’émergence de « normes contre la violence » dans le 
collectif politique Occupy Geneva que j’aborde ce problème : d’abord empiriquement par 
l’analyse de mes observations de terrain, puis théoriquement dans la discussion des résultats de 
l’étude. En conséquence de deux événements, catégorisés comme des agressions sexuelles, qui 
se sont produites dans leur camp, les membres d’Occupy Geneva ont décidé d’aborder ces sujets 
dans une assemblée générale. Leur but était d’amender leur charte de bonne conduite, afin d’en 
réviser les règles et de les compléter par l’ajout de nouvelles normes visant à réguler les « faits » 
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de « violence injustifiée. » Au cours d’une délibération collective, de nouvelles normes ont été 
conçues, débattues et adoptées par consensus. La rédaction de la nouvelle charte a eu lieu dans 
une seconde assemblée générale durant laquelle les normes écrites ont été formulées 
collectivement. Je montre que l’indignation contre les agressions sexuelles était le motif 
principal à l’origine de la modification de la première charte et que l’entier du processus de 
conception de ces normes était caractérisé par des émotions collectives. En effet, l’indignation, 
le mépris et la peur ont joué un rôle majeur dans l’émergence de normes prohibant la violence, 
permettant de punir et d’exclure un agresseur et prescrivant d’intervenir collectivement contre 
lui afin de neutraliser le danger qu’il représente. Ces résultats me conduisent à faire l’hypothèse 
que les normes sociales émergent des émotions et que les émotions fournissent des explications 
causales et fondationnelles (grounded) de cette émergence. De la sorte, les émotions permettent 
de répondre aux questions « Pourquoi les normes émergent-elles ?» et « Pourquoi ont-elles 
leurs formes spécifiques ? ». En bref, j’avance que les normes sociales ont des fondations 
émotionnelles. 
 
Mots-clefs : émergence des normes sociales, émotions, indignation et punition, mépris et 
exclusion sociale, peur et protection, normes émotionnelles, explication causale, explication 
ancrée, délibération collective, mouvements sociaux, mouvement Occupy 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Much of social theory takes social norms as given and is interested in explaining how 
individuals behave in relation to the norms of their social collective (Coleman, 1990: p. 241). 
But the problems of why and how norms emerge are central to social theory (Coleman, 1990; 
Hechter and Opp, 2001). Thus questions such as how norms are constituted in a social collective 
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and how they get their form are fundamental ones. My argument is that social norms emerge 
from emotions that also ground them: emotions explain why norms emerge and why they take 
their specific forms.  
In this paper, I look at the emergence of norms against violence in the political collective 
Occupy Geneva (OGVA). The aim of this study is to illustrate how the internal emotional 
dynamics or “reciprocal emotions” between members of a political movement (Goodwin et al., 
2000) helped to shape the institutions of their political association by introducing norms aimed 
at regulating their interactions. I show how indignation toward two incidents consensually 
categorized as sexual aggressions led to a collective deliberation during which the members of 
the collective elaborated norms meant to prevent and punish violence. Contempt felt toward the 
sexual aggressor also resulted in the adoption of a norm allowing for his social exclusion, and 
fear of taking action against him contributed to shaping the norms that eventually emerged.  
The idea that social norms have emotional foundations can be traced back to the work of authors 
such as Durkheim (2007 [1893]) who understood punishment in penal law as a passionate 
reaction, Ranulf (1933-34) who believed that indignation and envy were at the origin of 
criminal laws, and more recently Barbalet (2001) who considers that resentment and 
vengefulness motivate political activists’ claims for basic rights. The additional claim of this 
paper is a generalization of this argument, by saying that types of norms correspond to types of 
emotions. 
2. Emotions and “affective oughts” 
 
In this section, I give a definition of emotions and expose how they relate to norms in my theory. 
The aim is to present analytical tools that will help me analyze the empirical material, and to 
give substance to the general discussion at the end of the paper. 
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2.1. Working definition of emotions 
 
Emotions can be characterized in different ways, but for the purpose of this paper, I concentrate 
on the following components: physiological arousal, physiological expressions, subjective 
feelings, a pleasure-pain dimension, cognitive antecedents, core-relational theme, intentional 
object, action readiness change, concerns, and temporality (Frijda, 2007). I will not elaborate 
on each component, not because they are unimportant for sociologists, but simply because they 
are not central to my study. 
Emotions possess intentionality in the sense of being about something (Frijda, 2007; Deonna 
and Teroni, 2012): Maria’s fear is about the dangerous dog, Nina is indignant at corruption. 
They can be caused by beliefs, perceptions, memories, imagination, etc. (Frijda, 2007), and thus 
have cognitive antecedents; They are “felt bodily evaluative attitudes” (Deonna and Teroni, 
2012) that apprehend (dis-)values occurring in the world (de Souza, 1987; Tappolet, 2000). As 
such, indignation results from the evaluation of a situation seen as wrong, contempt from the 
evaluation of a person seen as unworthy. In fact, every type of emotion is differentiated by an 
associated value that philosophers call a “formal object” (Tappolet, 2000; de Souza, 1987; 
Deonna and Teroni, 2012) and psychologists call a “core relational theme” (Lazarus, 1991). 
But for an emotion to arise, the evaluation of a situation as exemplifying a (dis-)value is not 
sufficient. Indeed, emotions arise in “responses to events that are important to the individual’s 
concern” (Frijda, 2007: p. 7). Concerns consists of “personal attachments” to objects or values 
for which the individual cares (Roberts, 2003): they are “states of valuing” (Deonna and Teroni, 
2012).1 Thus anger resulting from an insult can only arise if the person values respect and fear 
of a dangerous dog can only arise if the individual values her life. 
                                                 
1 Since they are states of valuing, concerns are not identical to values. 
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Emotions are also motive states or “states of readiness” that prepare the individual to 
accomplish actions (Frijda, 2007). A state of readiness motivates, persists over time, exerts 
control precedence over other motive states; it is bodily felt and affects the whole individual; it 
also leads to a filtering of information: keeping the relevant and neglecting what is incompatible 
with the emotion (Frijda, 2007). Many states of readiness consist of “action tendencies”; that 
is, an impulse for accomplishing types of action. For instance, indignation prepares to punish 
the culprit (Ranulf, 1933-34; Elster, 2007), contempt to exclude the unworthy person (Fisher 
and Roseman, 2007), and fear2 to neutralize the danger (Deonna and Teroni, 2012). Action 
tendencies are not identical to actions but are states of readiness to act that do not necessarily 
actualize in concrete actions (Frijda, 2007). For instance, someone who is indignant at the 
wrongdoings of a culprit will not necessarily act in order to punish him. Thus, as Frijda (2007: 
p. 27) says, action readiness “refers to readiness for achieving a particular aim.” Emotional 
behavior is then intentional, since it is “oriented toward a future state” (Frijda, 2007: p. 27). 
This orientation can take the form of a “prior intention” that precedes the action or that of an 
“intention in action”3 that does not precede the action but is realized while performing it (Frijda, 
2007: p. 46).4 
But emotions do not only motivate motor actions; they also motivate cognitive processes and 
may induce “cognitive changes” (Frijda and Mesquita, 2000). Indeed, action readiness 
modulates attention, sets expectations and perceptual sensitivity, sets sensitivity for cognitive 
information gathering and also influences the estimation of the probability of events (Frijda, 
2007). It can thus motivate deliberation, calculation, and evaluation concerning future 
consequences of actions; this means that emotions influence deliberation and choice. Emotions 
                                                 
2 It is quite common to read that fear has three action tendencies: flee, freeze and fight. But they can be 
redescribed as sub-categories of the global tendency of neutralizing the danger. 
3 The notions “prior intention” and “intention in actions” comes from Searle (1985). Frijda uses them, but 
whereas he explicitly talks of “intention in action”, he uses “prior aim” for “prior intention.” 
4 Aranguren (this volume) gives an insightful clarification on the relation between intention and state of 
readiness in terms of “push” and “pull” factors. 
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can thus lead to belief changes (Elster, 2010; Frijda and Mesquita, 2000) such as value 
judgements (Deonna and Teroni, 2012; Prinz, 2006) and deontic judgements. 
2.2. Affective oughts and emotion rules 
 
Usually, sociologists who study emotions and social norms are interested in how social norms 
shape emotions. They are thus interested in how social norms contribute to the regulation of 
emotions by defining when an emotion is appropriate or inappropriate in a social context. More 
deeply, they are concerned with the internalization of norms and how they shape the sensitivity 
of the members of a collective. A leading figure of this approach is Hochschild (2003)5 for 
whom social norms, or “feeling rules,” define the type of emotion that one ought to feel (sadness 
during a funeral) or not to feel (envy toward a colleague). They define who should be 
emotionally aroused, when, where, with whom, toward whom, for how long, because of what, 
with what intensity and quantity. They set emotional rights and duties by defining obligation, 
interdiction, and permission governing emotional arousal, expression, and behavior. They set 
standards of comparison between what an individual is feeling and what he ought to feel in a 
given social context (marriage, funeral, workplace), and thus they help the public or the 
individual to evaluate the social (in-)appropriateness of the emotion felt. Emotion rules are thus 
extrinsic to the emotions they regulate and belong to the ordinary ethic of societies. 
Here an important remark on terminology must be done. Indeed, Hochschild (2003: p. 254) 
considers that “feeling” and “emotion” are interchangeable terms. But as Mulligan and Scherer 
(2012) state, this synonymy is misleading: an “integrative component” of emotions is their 
“subjective feeling”, and there are feelings that are not components of emotions (feeling of 
hunger or of pain in the foot, for instance). Since “feeling” and “emotion” are not identical, they 
cannot be used as synonyms. Thus strictly speaking the expression “feeling rules” cannot be 
                                                 
5 Nevertheless many of Hochschild's claims were anticipated in the seminal work of Mauss (1968-69). 
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used to mean “rules regulating emotions.” I will then follow Aranguren (this volume) who 
recommends substituting “emotions rules” to “feeling rules.” As he says, since feeling is one 
of the components of emotions among others, there is no good reason to restrict focus on “inner 
feeling”, for social norms regulate “emotions at large”, not only feelings. As such, emotion 
rules may regulate the different components of emotions: outer expression, evaluation, action, 
etc. The terminology being fixed, I come back to the main argument of this section. 
As said above, emotion rules are extrinsic to the emotion they regulate. But besides this 
extrinsic normativity or social appropriateness, emotions can also be assessed as (in-
)appropriate according to norms that belong to their nature and internal structure. Being internal 
to emotions, such norms can be called intrinsic norms. In order to show the contrast between 
the extrinsic and the intrinsic interpretations of “affective ought,” it is useful to give an example. 
Consider the expression what ought to be felt and the example of Allison’s envy toward her 
rival who has won a first prize in literature.6 In the extrinsic sense, if envy is considered a vice 
in Allison’s society, her envy would be assessed as inappropriate for moral reasons: she ought 
not to be envious. But in the intrinsic sense, Allison’s envy can be assessed as appropriate 
because her rival has won the prize that she coveted and because her rival’s success means that 
she cannot win the prize. In this case, envy is appropriate because it correctly represents (or 
fits) its object as being enviable (D'Arms and Jacobson, 2000; Deonna and Teroni, 2012); that 
is, it is exemplifying the formal object of this emotion. This example shows that even if envy 
can be socially inappropriate for moral reasons, it can be correct if its object is accurately 
presented as enviable (D'Arms and Jacobson, 2000).7 As such, envy “ought to be felt” because 
                                                 
6 The two meanings of appropriateness (property vs correctness) and the example of envy come from D'Arms 
and Jacobson (2000). I add to this picture the idea of distinguishing between “extrinsic and intrinsic norms or 
“extrinsic appropriateness” and “intrinsic appropriateness”. 
7 There might be cases when an emotion is both correct and socially appropriate: for instance, indignation toward 
a sexual aggression can be assessed as a correct emotional attitude since sexual aggression represents unjustified 
violence and as morally appropriate for the members of a society who can claim that it is a duty of being 
indignant toward sexual violence. 
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of the intrinsic norms of this emotion, but “ought not to be felt” because of social norms or 
emotion rules. For the sake of simplicity in distinguishing between both senses of 
appropriateness, I will use “social appropriateness” for the extrinsic meaning, and 
“correctness” for the intrinsic meaning.  
3. The emergence of norms against violence in Occupy Geneva 
3.1. Introducing Occupy Geneva 
 
Occupy Geneva (OGVA) was born October 15, 2011 in Geneva, Switzerland, and disappeared 
around May-June 2012. It was a nonpartisan political collective that was spontaneously created 
by inhabitants of Geneva alongside a worldwide demonstration against stock exchange markets 
organized by the Occupy Movement (Occupy Wall Street, Occupy Madrid, etc.). The collective 
thus joined the Occupy movement, which occupied symbolic places in many cities and 
countries in the world from spring 2011 onwards in order to denounce “democracy deficiency” 
and “unfair” economic relationships8. The Indignés of Geneva “occupied” a park in the center 
of the city, Le parc des Bastions. They settled a camp made of individual and collective tents; 
the camp grew after a few weeks to reach approximatively 40-50 tents. It is difficult to 
accurately estimate the number of members of the movement, but probably a maximum of 70 
to 80 persons lived in the camp, and there were about 350 sympathizers. Nevertheless, the 
arrival of winter, permanent conflicts, and demotivation led rapidly to a decline in participation. 
When the camp was shut down, fewer than 10 people lived in two tents. Not all members taking 
part in the general assemblies or the work groups (such as those against economic injustices or 
for capitalism alternatives) lived in the camp or lived in it permanently. 
                                                 
8 For studies about different instances of the Occupy Movement see the special issue “From Indignation to 
Occupation: A New Wave of Global Mobilization” of Current Sociology, edited by Benski, Langman, 
Perugorria & Tejerina in 2013. 
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The general assemblies (GAs) took place during the week in a tent mounted in the middle of 
the camp, whereas the Saturday GA was held outside the camp in front of the Wall of the 
Reformers9 in order to open up the GA to passersby and people who were reluctant to enter the 
camp. 
Various topics were discussed during the GAs, but mainly they could be divided into those that 
concerned the “community,” that is, the management of the camp (management of heating 
wood, guard turn, washing-up, reception of outsiders, etc.), and those concerning the “political 
association” (political actions, working group, strategy, negotiation with city authorities). After 
one week of existence, the Indignés decided to adopt a charter of good conduct in order to 
regulate their interactions and try to live together in harmony. Indeed, they encountered various 
“practical problems” in the camp and during the GA that resulted in conflicts, that the charter 
was supposed to help resolve. Examples of such “problems” were thefts, insults, fights, 
disregard of collective decisions, free-riding, noise during the night, lack of participation to the 
GA. One month later, as the same problems and new ones were encountered, they decided to 
revise the first version of the charter and adopt a second one. Finally, when they dismantled the 
camp, they elaborated a third version of the charter that was only concerned with the GA. 
 
3.2. Institutional organization 
 
A very interesting specificity of OGVA, which was shared with other collectives of the Occupy 
Movement, comes from the fact that the collective was organized by two types of social 
organization: the community (as exemplified by the common life in the camp) and the political 
association (as exemplified by the GA, working groups, action groups, etc.). But both collective 
                                                 
9 This wall celebrates the protestant Reform, and few major figures have their statues: Guillaume Farel, Jean 
Calvin, Théodore de Bèze and John Knox. 
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forms were organized according to the same two constitutive principles: participatory and 
deliberative democracy. The principle of participatory democracy “permits that everyone 
directly participate to a collective decision; [whereas] deliberative democracy demands to the 
citizens to participate in the elaboration of decisions, that is to the process that leads to them”  
(Livet, 2007: p. 111)10. Both principles were operative for the community, as anyone could join, 
camp, and take part in the collective decisions affecting the common life, and for the political 
association, as anyone could take part in the GA and express views during the decision-making 
process. Since I am interested in the emergence of norms, and the GA was invested with the 
power of a “central legislator”—it was there that the rules of the charters were discussed and 
adopted—a brief description of its functioning is necessary. 
 
3.2.1. Functioning of the general assembly 
 
The general assembly took place around 8:00 p.m. during the week and around 2:30 p.m. on 
Saturdays. It was formally constituted by those people,––members of OGVA or not (for 
instance, people who were curious to know what OGVA was)––, who decided to attend the 
GA. The assembly was regulated by one moderator, and it was sometimes supported by a 
second facilitator in charge of indicating when it was someone's turn to speak. At the beginning 
of the GA, the moderator invited members to set the agenda. Together, they decided the order 
of the topics, and finally the moderator opened up the discussion by asking who wanted to take 
the floor. People who wanted to express their views raised their hands, and the moderator (or 
the second facilitator when there was one) defined the order of the talks. Various signs were 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that both principles are distinct. Indeed, participatory democracy states that everyone has 
the right to participate: everyone is a member of the demos. By contrast, deliberative democracy concerns only 
the “citizens”, and thus is not incompatible with a society that distinguishes between those who are members of 
the demos and those who are not. 
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used in order to prevent people from interrupting the speaker so as to ensure the smooth 
unfolding of the debate. The deliberation process ended when people agreed on what to do 
about the issue raised. The decision was made by consensus: each single participant was 
expected to express that he or she agreed with the proposed decision. In case of disagreement, 
the deliberation continued until a consensus was reached. Generally, the consensual decision 
was proposed by the moderator, and it was him or her who claimed that the members of the GA 
had arrived at a common decision. 
 
3.2.2. The charters of good conduct 
 
As already stated, the Indignés felt the need to agree on and adopt rules for regulating their 
common life: they wrote charters of good conduct that served the purpose of maintaining their 
collective11. As such, the first two charters posited rules that applied to both the camp and the 
GA, whereas the third one was dedicated to the GA. Their changes over time mirror different 
practical problems that the Indignés encountered in the camp or during the GAs. In this paper, 
I am interested in the modification of the first rule of charters one and two; that is the ones 
concerned with both camp life and the regulation of GAs. In the first charter, rule number 1 
stated the following: 
 
- We will respect others 
- We will avoid insults, judgments, discriminations 
 
In the second charter, the statement of the rule was thus amended: 
 
                                                 
11 See Kaufmann (2010) for a discussion of the moment of maintenance contrasted with the moment of 
constitution of a social collective.  
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- We will respect ourselves as we respect others. 
- We will refuse any insult, judgment, or discrimination (based on race, gender, sexual 
orientation, etc.). 
- We will combat all forms of violence, verbal or physical, in particular sexual and/or 
racial violence. 
 
In what follows, I will attempt to explain why the rule was modified, and more specifically, I 
will focus on the modification of the verbs and the added content. But let me first describe the 
context in which these norms emerged. 
 
3.3. Context of emergence 
 
The modification of the rule is based on two distinct episodes involving a man and two young 
women in their twenties that the Indignés categorized as episodes12 exhibiting the same 
scenario: the man offered the women to take cocaine with him in a tent. Inside the tent, the man 
started to touch them. In reaction to the touching the women left the tent and shouted out loud. 
A few Indignés who were aware of both episodes categorized them as “sexual aggressions”, as 
it will be shown in the analysis of the collective deliberation, and decided to talk about them 
during the GA of November 10, 2011. Their aim, as it can be inferred from the analysis of the 
GA, was to amend the charter of good conduct so as to make explicit reference to those events. 
A collective deliberation followed, during which new rules were discussed and a consensus on 
the content of the new norms was reached. But the rules were not written during this GA. It was 
only on November 21st that the second charter was collectively written. As will become clear, 
                                                 
12 See the interventions of Armand in the first empirical extract. 
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indignation toward those sexual aggressions was the major motive that led the Indignés to 
modify their rules. For this reason, it is useful to provide a working definition of indignation. 
4. Indignation, a working definition 
 
The central theme or formal object of indignation is a wrong, and its action tendencies are the 
punishment of the wrongdoer and the nullification of the wrong situation. While indignation is 
a painful emotion belonging to the anger family, it differs from anger, and resentment. Indeed, 
anger is a reaction to personal offenses (Descartes, 1996 [1649]), and resentment is a reaction 
to domination construed as personal humiliation (Nietzsche, 1971), whereas indignation reacts 
to unjustified harm or good (Descartes, 1996 [1649]) that affects something13 or someone—a 
wrong resulting from the intentional ill-willed behavior of a wrongdoer (Strawson, 2008 
[1974]). In this sense, indignation can be felt for the bad that is done to others, since the wrong 
needs not to affect the person who is indignant at it (Descartes, 1996 [1649]). That is why 
indignation is typically, but not necessarily, felt by a third party who attends the wrong (Elster, 
2009; Ranulf, 1933-34). Thus the resulting tendency to punish of indignation can be called a 
“disinterested tendency to punish” (Ranulf, 1933-34). Indeed, the spectator is ready to punish 
the wrongdoer without expecting any individual profit or even at his own expense (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Ranulf, 1933-34). An additional action tendency 
is the tendency to nullify the wrong: the spectator is ready to intervene in order to stop and to 
make disappear the wrong situation. But those two action tendencies are “subspecies” of the 
general goal of the emotion: (re-)establishing the right.  Finally, the concern of indignation can 
be described as a concern for the right understood as an attachment to the respect of superior 
                                                 
13 The nation, the state, the traditional family, esthetic canons, a vandalized painting, etc. 
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common goods.14 In the OGVA case, the relevant “collectively shared concern” (Salmela, 
2012) for the modification of the charter was the “respect for others”, as the charter shows it.  
 
5. Explaining the emergence of norms against violence in 
OGVA 
In this section I present field observations so as to analyze the process of emergence of the new 
rules. My empirical materials consist of transcripts of the recorded dialogues that the Indignés 
held during their GAs. The elaboration of the norms can be described as a temporal sequence 
divided into three stages, as represented in the scheme below. 
. 
 Stage 1 Stage 2  Stage 3 
 
 
  
Events in Collective deliberation Collective deliberation 
 the camp and decision  and decision 
    
   
 Modification of charter n°1 Writing of charter n°2 
 
The first stage is the public denunciation, during the GA of November 10th, of the two episodes 
involving the man and the two women that had previously caused the indignation of a few 
Indignés. The second stage is the elaboration of a collective reaction against them during the 
same GA, where the rules were discussed and a consensus was reached by the members. The 
                                                 
14 Laurence Kaufmann (personal communication) qualifies indignation as being concerning around superior 
common goods. Examples of superior common goods are values such as human dignity, respect, justice, liberty, 
equality, sacred, beauty, sublime, health, wealth, peace, etc. 
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third stage concerns the GA of November 21st, where members revised the first charter of good 
conduct and wrote the second version, by taking into account the consensual decision of 
November 10th. This analytic division allows showing the successive stages of the elaboration 
of the norms and also provides the steps of the explanation. 
 
5.1. The General assembly of November 10, 2011 
 
The major instigator that led to the modification of the first norm of the charter of good conduct 
came from the sexual aggressions committed by a man against two young women in the camp. 
The man was not a member of the collective. Like others, he just came to the camp to “hang 
around” without joining OGVA’s activities. The Indignés did not know his name, but they knew 
his nationality, and thus they called him the “Brazilian.” Both episodes were denounced and 
discussed during the GA of November 10, 2011. This GA lasted about two hours, and the 
discussion about the aggressions lasted about one hour. Around 25 people took part in the GA. 
Interestingly, neither the victims nor the assailant were present during the GA, and not all 
members of the GA had heard about the aggressions prior to the GA. The discussion thus finds 
its roots in the testimony of few Indignés who were in the camp when the aggressions occurred. 
As a matter of fact, since the victims were not there when the deliberation took place, the latter 
was entirely composed of third-party spectators. 
 
5.1.1. First stage: call for third-party regulation 
 
The GA had begun one hour earlier. The Indignés had spoken about various problems occurring 
in the camp: lack of hygiene, thefts, insults, drugs, etc. Now it was the turn of Lukas, who 
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wanted to speak about a specific kind of problem he had noticed: gender violence. His talk was 
spontaneously followed by those of Armand, Milo, and Edis, who did not ask the moderator for 
permission to speak. 
 
Lukas, bright, sharp, very lively: […] By the way, there’s something… In relation to the rules and 
all that. What’s been really bothering me lately… for me, it’s extremely important that violence is 
explicitly mentioned, the sort of violence that’s – how shall I say? – verbal and, above all, about 
gender relations. I’m not sure if you follow me? (Lydie :”Yes, yes”.) Certain forms of gender 
violence, sexual violence, but sexual in a very broad sense, that we absolutely don’t tolerate! No, 
what I mean is that we don’t tolerate anyone hassling a girl or a guy (Armand: “It happened last 
night”) in a way that’s linked to their sexuality. 
Armand: “It happened last night and it’s really not cool.” 
Someone agrees: “Yea, yea”. 
Milo: “But it wasn’t only last night, it also happened… The same person as when we were there 
on the other side.” 
Armand: “OK. Well I got the same impression afterwards as well.” 
Edis: “Who are we actually talking about? Because we mustn’t hesitate!” 
Armand: “A Brazilian you never see anywhere, who never participates in anything. In any case, it’s 
not Fabiano or his usual mates; it’s a guy on coke.” (Milo: “Right.”) “Let’s call a spade a spade – 
who attracts chicks with his coke and then takes them into his tent (Someone whistles softly) and 
they come out yelling “Leave me alone! Let me out! Fuck, you’re nuts!” (Someone whistles softly) 
So I warned him: next time “Eu te mata” [I’ll kill you in Portuguese]. That’s it. It’s clear. And I’ll 
do it! So now he knows where it’s at.” 
 
Lukas denounces behavior that manifests violence. He focuses mainly on violence that he calls 
sexual or gender violence. His denunciation has a purpose: he wants the charter of good conduct 
to be modified in order to have new rules that clearly stipulate that any kind of gender violence 
is forbidden. He says also that the notion of gender violence must be understood very widely, 
that means that the definition ought to cover physical as well as verbal violence, but also 
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violence against women as well as against men. In that specific case, he speaks of sexual 
orientation. Lukas does not make explicit reference to a particular event; he speaks in general. 
During an interview I asked him what he had in mind when he spoke. He explained to me that 
he had been particularly outraged by an Indigné who had said in a casual conversation that 
homosexuality was disgusting and that he did not approve of it. But Lukas also spoke of other 
men who indulged in sexist talk, as well as the sexual aggressions that occurred in the camp. 
Interestingly, we see that Lukas—who is heterosexual—reacted with indignation to gender 
violence, judging that such violence was bad and intolerable. Implicitly, this denunciation is 
also an act of accusation against those who were “guilty” of performing such violence. By the 
way, since both speech acts are made in front of the assembly, they also consist of a call to a 
third-party regulation by orienting the attention of the public to gender violence and by calling 
for a modification of the charter of good conduct. Remarkably, Lukas formulates a proscription 
under the form of a norm in which the pronoun “we” is used: “We don’t tolerate anyone hassling 
a girl or a guy in a way that is linked to their sexuality”: a potential “we” emerges that entails 
the evaluative judgments that violence is bad and intolerable, and the deontic judgements that 
such violence ought to be forbidden. This “we” at this specific time is only potential, because 
the collective deliberation by which other members of the community are called to give their 
approval to this “we” has just started: no consensus about the legitimacy of the norm that Lukas 
proposes has yet emerged. 
After Lukas, Armand takes the floor and informs the public in vague terms that something 
falling under the category of gender violence “happened yesterday.” In saying “it’s really not 
cool,” he expresses disapproval and condemnation of the act he has in mind: the second sexual 
aggression. Someone expresses approval, saying “Yea, yea,” and Milo adds that another sexual 
aggression occurred. Armand says it seemed to him that this was the case. Edis reacts and asks 
who the assailant is: his name must be given without hesitation. These turns at talk involve 
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further denunciations of the sexual aggressions, but also an accusation of their perpetrator, 
whose identity is sought: indignation seeks a culprit. 
In response, Armand, who was in the camp when the second aggression was perpetrated and 
who had heard about the first one, informs the assembly about the identity of the assailant. His 
description remains quite vague. The author is described as not taking part in the activity of the 
collective; he is “Brazilian” and a cocaine addict. Milo confirms this short description. 
Remarkably, the description means that this person is categorized as not being a member of the 
collective: he has no name and does not participate. Following the description, Armand tells 
what he heard and how he reacted when the second aggression occurred. But rather than 
speaking only about the second aggression, he aggregates both aggressions and produces a 
narrative that becomes the common structure of both events, therefore considered as two 
instances of the same type. 
The “Brazilian” is presented as a seducer who offers cocaine to the young women (they were 
in their twenties) and makes them follow him under a tent in order to take the drug. Under the 
tent, the women endure sexual touching, a scene that is not explicitly described but only hinted 
at. Then the women go out of the tent screaming, “Leave me alone! Let me out! Fuck, you’re 
nuts!” The young women are thus presented as victims who have suffered from bad treatment. 
Indeed, the words that Armand puts in the mouth of both women give access to their suffering. 
But what Armand is really narrating is only the second aggression: when Christine was 
assaulted, she went out of the tent screaming and went straight to the tent where Armand and 
several Indignés were, including Milo, in order to seek help and protection. After hearing 
Christine’s screams and what she related, Armand, just like he says to the assembly, went 
straight to the “Brazilian” and threatened him with death: “Eu te mata.” 
So what exactly is Armand doing with this narrative? As we see, he does not tell very accurately 
the “facts”; for instance, he does not use the names of the victims, Christine and Laya, which 
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he knows. Indeed, he makes a generalization and speaks of “girls.” As such, the concrete actions 
of the Brazilian’s aggressions against both Christine and Laya are modified: the surnames 
making reference to singular individuals or persons are substituted with the impersonal and 
general social category of women. This constitutes a first redescription of both events that will, 
during the collective deliberation, lead to an abstract typification implying social categories: 
men and women connected with actions typified as violent and wrong, where the men occupy 
the position of the “strong” who through sexual violence inflict unjustified harm to the “weak”, 
a position that is in the present case occupied by women. Thus, the situation of sexual violence 
is seen as a wrong that exhibits one of the basic appraisals of indignation: a strong inflicts 
unjustified harm to a weak (Descartes, 1996 [1649])15.  
This “factual” relation is very important for the GA because it presents what happened in the 
camp to the members of the assembly. Armand’s speech works as an activator of collective 
indignation both for those who are already aware of those events and for those who are hearing 
from them for the first time. It is according to Armand’s speech that the theme of unjustified 
wrong enters into the collective discussion and triggers collective indignation. 
Now, it appears that indignation is not the only emotion that the description can be said to 
involve. Indeed, the Brazilian is presented as a drug addict: a character that inspired contempt 
in Armand, as he showed on many occasions during the ethnography16. But contempt for the 
“vice” of “using drugs” is not the only one and maybe not the most important for the collective 
                                                 
15 This appraisal can be identified since a “sexual assault” is by definition a situation where the assailant “takes 
advantage” and “makes suffer” his victim by force and against her will. 
16 Armand’s general contempt can be illustrated by two GAs (among others) where he evaluated people 
categorized as drug addicts negatively, expressed stereotypical judgments, the will to exclude them, and reported 
that he undertook actions in order to do so. In the first GA, a discussion about drug dealings took place. Armand 
qualified people he identified as “customers” coming into the camp to buy and take drugs as “guys who have the 
face of a dead fish”. He added to this remark that he “has to kick them off [the camp] regularly” (GA, 
November, 28th). In the second GA, when the issue of expelling drug addicts who had tents in the camp came 
into discussion, Armand backed up this measure. And when an Indigné made the remark that Armand 
categorized and negatively evaluated people as drug addicts without evidence, he explained that he was able to 
recognize drug addicts at first sight, because:” I was addicted to heroin for 30 years, so I can’t forget what it 
makes people look like: I see it; from 100 meters, I see it.” (GA, November, 30th). 
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deliberation. Actually, the fact of being a sexual assailant—a fortiori, a person evaluated as 
being bad—triggered strong contempt against the Brazilian, who was further categorized as a 
rapist, a term particularly infamous for the Indignés. But another emotion seems present: 
compassion for the women, considered in the narrative of Armand to have suffered. In the 
following pages I do not expound further on the theme of pity. Indeed, I am interested in the 
elaboration of norms that targeted the wrong situation and the culprit, and not in the elaboration 
of norms that, related to pity, targeted the victims and aimed at alleviating their suffering. 
5.1.2. Second stage: how to react? 
 
The rest of the GA does not revolve around the qualification of the events as unfair but rather 
around the matter of how to organize a collective answer against potential future sexual 
violence. It is then a matter discussion that, by anticipation, aims on the one hand to find means 
of preventing such events from happening again and on the other hand to determine the suitable 
individual or collective behavior that members ought to have if the aggressor comes back to the 
camp or if new aggressions occur. 
Continuing Armand’s speech, Edis asks for further information on the aggressor: 
 
Edis: “Does this person have a tent here?” 
Milo: “No.” 
Armand: “Yes, under the tree.” 
Milo: “No, that’s not him. That’s Bruno.” 
Armand: “Well then, he doesn’t have a tent. He squats in I don’t know whose tents. (Edis: “I 
suggest…”) But he shouldn’t be here.” 
Edis: “He shouldn’t be here! (Armand: No.) Well that’s it, that’s what I wanted to say. If he had a 
tent, we’d have had to deal with that… Next time he’s here, whoever has already seen him should 
alert people. (Armand: Black, shaved head.) If you want to do it by yourself, go ahead. But call the 
others, explain the situation and then go and tell him that he’s not wanted here. (Armand: Black, 
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shaved head, a bit affected.) Because that’s precisely the thing that there’s no debate about.” (General 
Assembly, 10 November 2011) 
 
Edis ask if the “Brazilian” has a tent in the camp, but Milo answers that he does not. Armand 
confuses the Brazilian with someone else, Bruno, and Milo correct him and say that Bruno is 
not the right guy. They rely on the intrinsic norms of contempt and indignation that ought to be 
directed toward the wrongdoer. Armand states vigorously that the aggressor has no reason to 
be in the camp. Edis agrees. This sentence can be understood as a deontic judgment that states 
that “the aggressor is not allowed in the camp.” It is unclear what Edis means about reacting if 
the aggressor had a tent in the camp, but implicitly he seems to be asking whether this individual 
really belongs to OGVA. Since he does not have a tent, the reaction is straightforward: the next 
time he is in the camp, the Indignés have the obligation to expel him; any single person may do 
it alone, or additional people may be called for help. In order to expel him, they must explain 
the situation to him and make him leave. The means of expulsion are thus language but also the 
collective strength of being many against the aggressor. In short, Edis devises different rules. 
First, the aggressor has no reason to be in the camp, he ought to be excluded. In case he comes 
back, the Indignés ought to expel him. But the question of who ought to be the agent of the 
expulsion is also raised: one member or many of them? Both possibilities are allowed. Edis also 
states that the expulsion ought to be done by speech and not violent conduct: it is a matter of 
signifying to this man that he ought to leave. At the same time, Armand expresses contempt for 
this man in saying that he is pretentious. 
The themes of the expulsion and exclusion that are apparent in this excerpt refer to the 
movement that goes from indignation at the wrong done to contempt at the wrongdoer, whose 
acts reveal the “badness” of his character (being a sexual predator). It can be inferred that the 
norms that Edis expresses are rooted in his contempt for the aggressor. This talk is important 
for the rest of the collective deliberation, as it is the first time that contempt and a rule that aims 
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to banish sexual predators are expressed. In the course of the collective discussion these themes 
are developed by Lydie, who intervenes just after Edis to confirm that this man ought to be 
expelled. Lukas says that she is right and that there is no possible tolerance with a sexual 
assailant. 
After the publicization of indignation and contempt, the deliberators attempt to regulate their 
hostile action tendencies. Two opposite camps emerge: the first one wants to moderate or even 
suppress the hostility toward the aggressor, whereas the second one wants to maintain the 
hostility and amplify it against the attempts at moderation of the first camp. This discussion 
putting in play “emotion rules” but also “intrinsic norms”, as we will see, can be understood as 
a deliberation about the right sanctions and their proportionality. The sanctions have to fit the 
degrees of the wrong and the badness of the wrongdoer. Indeed, punishment can take various 
forms that vary in their degrees of severity—from blame to corporal punishment to execution—
and expulsion involves degrees in the sense that it can be temporary or permanent, but also 
partial or complete. The sanctions are also discussed in order to respect moral norms. 
 
Hostility moderation and suppression 
 
After the talks of Lydie and Lukas, Viviane goes back to what Armand said: that he is ready to 
kill the Brazilian if he assaults a woman again: 
 
Viviane: “There’s one thing that strikes me though. It’s the fact of saying ‘Heh, if I see you I’m 
going to kill you, I’m going to do you in, I’ll smash your face.” 
Armand: “But that’s all he understands!” 
Viviane: “No! In any case I believe we’re here to act peacefully. Already last week when we weren’t 
properly organized yet, we had to deal with a knifing. (Armand: But there were 50 of us.) So we’re 
not about to start punching someone in the face. I reckon we’ve got other ways of dealing with this; 
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and I really don’t want someone dead because someone else lost it, even if there’s been a rape, even 
if… We don’t need a death here.” 
 
She explains that she is struck by Armand’s hostility who is ready to physically attack the 
aggressor and to kill him. She claims that they have to act peacefully. She does not want anyone 
to die in the camp. Even if there is a rape, the consequence should not be death. Armand 
contradicts her: the man understands only violent threats. Viviane seems to be outraged by the 
potential violence of Armand. She thus affirms an extrinsic norm—no one should be killed—
in order to regulate the “extreme” punishment that Armand imagines. But when she says that 
even if a woman is raped, death is not the proper response, she seems to think that the death 
penalty might apply but is not a morally legitimate punishment. She then seems to recognize 
that the intrinsic norm “the wrongdoer ought to be punished for what he did” could lead to 
extreme violence. But it is incompatible with the norm “it is forbidden to kill.” Thus, she does 
not refute that the aggressor should be punished, but only that physical violence is not a 
legitimate means of punishment. One can act peacefully in order to regulate the problematic 
situation. In her speech she also makes reference to an incident that took place at the very 
beginning of OGVA: a member had threatened another member with a knife. She says that they 
were able to manage this dangerous situation. Armand reacts by saying that they were fifty. 
This “knife episode” was considered by the Indignés who made reference to it—just like 
Viviane—as an example of successful collective regulation in which people managed to oppose 
an aggressor and talk to him, but they could also regulate and moderate members who, under 
the sway of strong emotions, were prone to take bodily actions against the aggressor. In sum, 
Viviane formulates an obligation to act peacefully, a prohibition of physical violence, a 
prohibition of murder, and implicitly an obligation to act collectively in order to regulate 
anybody who manifests aggressive behavior, either the aggressor himself or an Indigné acting 
as a third-party regulator. And she further categorizes the events as “rape.” 
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After four quick speeches that are not directly relevant for the present analysis, Juan requests 
the floor. He speaks in Spanish and is translated by Edis and Irene. In order to understand Juan’s 
speech it is important to note that he was a hippie living in a tepee in the camp. He was a 
supporter of universal peace and love and an adept of Ho’oponopono, a traditional Hawaiian 
technique that aims to produce harmony and peace among people by means of self-
transformation and forgiveness. Importantly, his speech about Ho’oponopono is shared by two 
new members: Frank and Odile. For lack of space, I will not reproduce their speeches, since 
their content is in substance equivalent to Juan’s speech, and the reactions of the Indignés who 
do not agree are also quite the same as those that Juan’s speech produces. 
 
Juan: Because of all the mistakes people make, rejection will only make things worse. Because of 
the mistakes someone makes, brutal rejection only worsens the situation […] Our only hope to solve 
problems is love, gestation and love, it’s our only hope in the world.” 
Armand: “Pfff… Yea… With a rapist? With a rapist that doesn’t work.” 
Juan: What we think of someone who does something bad is very important because the person 
feels what we’re thinking and it’s registered in the energy field that connects us all. For me that’s 
quite clear […] If someone does something awful and you hate him because of it…” 
Edis: “But Juan, we’re not talking about that.” 
Juan: “I’ll talk about whatever I feel like talking about. This is an assembly, isn’t it?” 
Edis: “Yes, but we’re talking about what happened today. It’s really serious that some girls 
have…” 
Juan: “Hatred is something very serious in the world. Which is why I want to talk about it.” 
Armand: “Twice! Two girls! Laya and now little Christine there.” 
Edis: “Two girls have been harassed.” 
Juan: “Let me finish.” 
Armand: “Never two without a third!” 
Juan: “What I want to say is very important. Just as important as the fact that this is a very bad 
person.” 
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Irene: “It’s to learn how to defuse exactly this kind of conflict. In general.” 
Juan: If you want to help a person who does bad things, the easiest way is to send him positive 
thoughts and love, even if he’s a murderer. It can be Hitler or anyone. 
Edis (translating): “If you want to help someone who’s doing something bad, the best thing you 
can do is... Pfff... to love him in your mind.” (He turns to the audience as he says this, looking 
disenchanted, and people laugh.) 
Juan: If someone does something bad and we send him negative thoughts it worsens the situation 
and won’t cure... 
Edis (translating): “Negative thoughts make things worse.” 
Armand: “I agree with that! I agree with that!”  
Juan: “And that’s difficult. It’s hard to accept giving love to what’s bad, to what we don’t like.” 
Edis (translating): “It’s difficult to accept sending love to people we don’t like.” 
Armand: “Pouh!!!” 
 
Juan attempts to regulate the hostility expressed by the Indignés who have already spoken. He 
explains that rejecting people who committed errors would have negative consequences and 
would worsen the situation. In his mind, the rejection takes the form of negative energy that is 
sent through magic thinking to the faulty and that negatively affects the mutual connection of 
human beings, who are connected by an energetic field. Later on he explains that negative 
thinking or hatred corresponds to black magic, whereas positive thinking or love corresponds 
to white magic. According to him, if the world is to become a better place, it needs love and not 
hatred. The underlying rationale is that bad people (even Adolf Hitler) need to be helped and 
cured: they are also suffering human beings, and as such are proper recipients of compassion 
and love, not hostility. Then Juan calls for cognitive work or “deep acting17” (Hochschild, 2003) 
in order to reappraise the situation and the assailant: the aim is to come to see the latter not as 
an offender who, as a proper object of indignation and contempt, deserves to be punished, but 
                                                 
17 Hochschild takes this expression from actor and theater director Stanislavski. 
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as a “victim” who suffers and, as a proper object of compassion, deserves to be helped and 
loved18. Thus, in his talk Juan formulates a prohibition of violence, because of “negative 
energetic feedback,” the obligation to love everybody since it has good consequences for the 
world as a whole, and the obligation of compassion toward the assailant, who ought to be seen 
as a suffering person and helped (cured) just like the intrinsic norms of compassion require. 
 
Hostility maintenance and amplification 
 
Juan’s talk raised several complaints and objections along two lines: the right evaluation of the 
situation and its agent, and the right actions that should be performed in order to deal with them. 
Interestingly, Juan’s formulation of a duty of compassion and love consists of an emotion rule 
that is extraneous to indignation and contempt; it targets both emotions in order to suppress 
them and replace them with love and compassion. The counterarguments pose emotion rules 
too, yet these rely this time on the intrinsic norms of indignation and contempt. The purpose of 
the objections is to reaffirm and amplify hostility against the attempts to moderate or suppress 
it. Indeed, when Armand says that Juan’s suggestion does not apply to someone categorized as 
a rapist and that the aggressor is a recidivist because he has committed two aggressions (on 
Laya and Christine) and may do so again in the future (“things come in threes”), he denies that 
this man has to be seen as someone suffering. He thus reaffirms that the Brazilian ought to be 
seen as a “rapist” because his acts show what kind of person he is: someone who does not 
deserve good treatment, but rather someone who is an appropriate target of hostility. Thus this 
man is considered not to be an appropriate object of compassion but to be an appropriate object 
of indignation and contempt. According to Armand these emotions are deemed “correct” 
because they “fit” the “facts”: “a rapist has committed sexual assaults.” 
                                                 
18 This view about “proper object” and “desert” are taken from Adam Smith’s view about how gratitude and 
resentment aptly fit their objects (Smith, 2002 [1790]). 
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In the same vein, Edis reaffirms that the two women were victims of aggressions and that the 
situation is serious. Interestingly, he tells Juan that his speech is irrelevant to the discussion on 
the right reaction to the aggressions. It seems that the indignation Edis felt led him to put aside 
the information that was not relevant to the wrong; that is, the attempt of Juan to modify the 
hostile feelings by a reappraisal of the aggressor so as to see him as an object of love and 
compassion. Indeed, Edis tried to modify Juan’s view by reorienting his attention to the facts 
and the injustice done. It seems that his indignation has led him to say that indignation is the 
correct emotion for the wrong done, not compassion. Thus Edis implicitly resorts to an intrinsic 
norm of indignation: one ought to react with indignation when facing a wrong. But this norm, 
since it is expressed and targets Juan, is also to be understood as an extrinsic emotion rule that 
states what type of emotion must be felt and is socially appropriate. It is as if Edis said to Juan, 
“you ought to be indignant at the facts, not compassionate.” It is interesting to remark that 
several persons in the assembly laugh sarcastically when Edis turns to them, thus manifesting 
disapproval of what Juan says. Nevertheless, he gets Armand’s approval when he states that 
negative thinking may worsen the situation. But he gets Armand’s disapproval again when he 
reasserts that even if it is difficult to give love to what is bad, it is an imperative. 
As a continuation of the previous sequence, Lukas demands to talk and provides 
counterarguments to Juan’s view. 
 
Lukas (curtly): “So Juan, I agree 200% with what he said. Euh... For me love is something very 
 beautiful. However, I think... (excitedly) 5000 years of sexual oppression of women... we’re not 
going to resolve that by giving people a little bit of love. I think... For me, it’s extremely important 
to indicate a clear line of what is unacceptable. You can do that with love, but you can also use 
other means. And I’m sorry, if someone uses methods that have nothing to do with loving someone 
who harasses women here, I’ll be delighted!” 
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Lukas disapproves of Juan’s speech. He formulates a limit between what is acceptable and what 
is not: sexual oppression is not tolerable. But he does not only indicate a limit; he also says that 
this limit counts for everyone. This may mean two things: first, everyone must respect the norm 
forbidding sexual violence, and second, the norm should be there in order to command the 
members to react to violence when they see it. Considering, like Armand and Edis, that hostility 
is an apt reaction to sexual aggression, Lukas states that he approves of violence against an 
aggressor. Thus Lukas takes a further step in the use of the intrinsic norms of indignation: 
indignation is not only the correct emotion in response to sexual wrongs, but the action tendency 
of punishing is legitimate against a rapist. In other words, the culprit is a correct object of 
punishment: he ought to be punished for and expiate his deeds. Of course, as previously said, 
this intrinsic norm being exteriorized, becoming public, and targeting Juan (and Viviane 
implicitly) also works as an extrinsic emotion rule. But in this case, it concerns the right 
treatment that the rapist deserves: physical violence for his wrong actions is correct since it fits 
the fact and it is socially appropriate because it is moral to be indignant at wrongdoings and to 
wish to punish the wrongdoer. 
The speeches that I have reported represent the main antagonist positions of the Indignés during 
the GA. Indeed, on the one side, there were those who were against any kind of violence and 
supported collective actions of a pacifist nature against the aggressor. Among them, people like 
Juan, Irene, Odile, and Frank also argued for a strong regulation of the hostile action tendencies 
of indignation and contempt that had to be suppressed and replaced with nonhostile action 
tendencies (love, compassion). But they did not deny that sexual aggressions and being a rapist 
were bad and wrong. They simply thought that hostility would be ineffective and risky, and that 
it was possible to stand firm in front of an aggressor without being aggressive. They seemed to 
believe that expressing disapproval and blame in a calm way were sufficient degrees of 
punishment. On the other side, there were those who believed that sexual aggression and a rapist 
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deserved to be punished strongly and expelled from the collective, and that non-hostility was 
not the proper reaction, as Armand, Edis, and Lukas indicated. Thus two “we” corresponding 
to each group emerged: they were not yet unified in a higher “consensual” “we” that would 
represent the “general will” of the members of the assembly. 
But another view about the right reaction of the third party was discussed after two other talks. 
It was expressed by a man I was unable to identify19: 
 
A man: “I think you’d still better think about how you’re going to get rid of him. Because the 
problem with junkies, people like that, I mean people on coke, is that they might want to come back 
and take their revenge. So, if someone just fronts him on their own and tells him to get lost, he’ll 
most probably come back alone to get even. So best do something collective to make him 
understand...  […] Or do it in stages, I dunno. Give it some thought because if it’s a spontaneous 
thing, I can see that a guy who’s capable of doing that here, well... Maybe he’ll do it and maybe not, 
I really don’t know.” 
 
Here the emphasis is put on the potential danger that a drug addict may pose to a third party 
who intervenes for expelling him out of the camp. This can be interpreted as a call to caution 
for fear of the third party. Indeed, this talk is about danger, which is the formal object of fear. 
Another aspect of the situation thus comes to light: if a third party who is contemptuous wants 
to expel the wrongdoer, she faces the risk of violent retaliation. Thus, in order to neutralize this 
risk as the action tendency of fear requires it, a strategy must be elaborated so as to realize the 
goal of contempt: social exclusion. 
To continue this recommendation, Edis speaks one more time: 
 
                                                 
19 This person was not part of the collective but apparently was here because of his curiosity, just like others who 
did the same. 
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Edis: “I’d like to remind you […]. So, the aim of having this discussion was to write clearly that we 
don’t tolerate this. And then, it’s clear, as we’ve said a thousand times, that we don’t react to violence 
with violence. But if someone is in the process of attacking someone, you’re not going to have a 
conversation with him. The first thing to do is to prevent the aggression and you can discuss things 
with him later […]” 
 
There the action tendency of preventing the wrong proper to indignation gives rise to a norm 
that we can roughly formulate in these terms: “we ought to nullify the wrong, and for this 
purpose violence is appropriate, and thus permitted.” Violence in this case is not proposed as a 
punishment, which is expiation for one’s misdeeds, but as a justified means to nullify the wrong. 
Edis adds that it is only when the aggression is stopped that the third party can start to discuss 
nonviolently with the aggressor. He seems thus to think that violence as a punishment is not 
desirable. 
After several speeches of members who elaborate the various positions that I have exposed, 
Lukas asks for a consensus about the right reaction to sexual aggression. The focus is on the 
interpretation of “firmness”; that is, the right degree of hostility. On the one hand, “firmness” 
may mean to only use calm speech in order to blame the wrongdoer and command him to leave 
the camp; on the other hand, it may mean that violence for preventing the wrong and/or 
punishing and expelling the wrongdoer is appropriate. 
 
Lukas: “[...] But for a consensus, would someone have a problem with me if I don’t signal love but 
firmness? Would someone personally have a problem with that? (Frank: The one doesn’t exclude 
the other.) Yea, exactly. But it could be a consensus. I don’t act in terms of love, not at all, in this 
kind of situation. Will someone have a problem if I do that?” 
Frank: “Yes, yes.” 
Viviane: “Just as long as there’s no extreme violence that could harm the camp, that’s all. Yep.” 
Lukas: “No, you know me. I won’t be nice with the person, but I won’t beat him up.” 
Viviane: “Yes, no, that’s clear.” 
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A woman: “I mean, there’s been an aggression and it has to stop.” 
 
Lukas repeats his position that violence under its different forms (punishment, prevention) is 
appropriate against a sexual aggressor. Frank says that firmness and pacifism are not 
incompatible, and he disagrees with the hostility of Lukas. Viviane approves of Lukas saying 
that hostility is tolerated, as far as violence is not detrimental to the camp. Lukas answers that 
in such a case he will not physically assault the aggressor, but he will not be nice to him. Finally, 
a woman says that if there is an aggression “one ought to stop it,” meaning that violence is a 
proper means to do so. The Indignés consider at this moment that a consensus is found. But it 
is only a “pseudo-consensus20,” since the notion of “firmness” stays ill-defined and admits 
different degrees: this notion is subject to interpretation. The Indignés in their attempt of making 
emerge the “consensual” “we” that would represent the “general will” of the members fail to 
do it in certain way. But one consensual result seems to be that extreme violence, like murder, 
is prohibited. 
Several other discussions occur about the danger that a rapist represents for women who sleep 
alone under a tent in the camp, which I will not present because this would lead us to analyze 
the emergence of norms for the protection of victims, which is not the topic of this paper 
dedicated to indignation and contempt. Eventually, Lydie, the moderator, asks for a final 
decision or consensus: 
 
Lydie: “OK, so I just wanted to...Can we conclude this GA? [...] I think we’ve just about gotten to a 
consensus on saying that these cases of aggression, whether linked to gender, race, sexual orientation 
or to … (Viviane: Violence in general) Right. All kinds of violence, exactly. Her tone sharpens. 
Violent acts in general are not tolerated in this camp! That’s the line... It’s a clear limit, OK? We’ve 
                                                 
20 To call this consensus a “pseudo-consensus” is justified in the sense that the Indignés arrived at a genuine 
consensus on several occasion when everyone gave publicly their assent to a collective decision. For instance, 
about what types of political action perform. In our case, there is no consensus on the right meaning of 
“firmness”, but the Indignés do as if they had all agreed. 
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got a consensus on that. No kind of violence is tolerated. Everyone is responsible, individually and 
collectively, we’re all responsible, if we see something, to report it, to do something to counter it 
whether personally or, if one of us sees something happen and doesn’t feel capable of handling it 
alone, to discuss it with others and intervene collectively. We agree that we don’t want to be violent 
but that we’ll be firm, uh... really very firm.  [...] Can we conclude with that?” 
 
This consensus proposal is collectively approved, and closes the GA. It is important to note that 
the consensus does not include all the norms that were discussed: it is poorer compared to the 
content of the deliberation. Indeed, the theme of violence and the tendency to stop the wrong 
are linked to indignation: the third-party must react against violence. But the tendency to punish 
is not clearly stated: it remains implicit in the notion of firmness whether this one is interpreted 
as justified violence or only as justified blame. Contempt for the assailant is absent. But the 
tendency to expel/exclude seems to be implicitly included in the norm considering the proper 
reaction of the third-party who ought to intervene against violence. Fear is also present: if the 
third-party who should intervene “doesn’t feel capable of handling it alone”, he should call for 
backup. Thus the tendency to neutralize the danger translates as a duty to search for help in 
order to face the aggressor. 
 
5.2. The general assembly of November 21, 2011 
 
It was only on November 21 2011 that the second charter of good conduct was written. All the 
rules of the first charter were discussed and modified in greater or lesser extent. As a reminder, 
in the first charter rule number 1 stated: 
 
- We will respect others 
- We will avoid insults, judgments, discriminations 
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This rule was thus modified in the second charter: 
 
- We will respect ourselves as we respect others 
- We will refuse any insult, judgment, discrimination (based on race, gender, sexual 
orientation, etc.) 
- We will combat all forms of violence, verbal or physical, in particular sexual and/or 
racial violence  
 
I am interested in the underlined modifications that correspond to the deliberation of November 
10th. The addition of a duty of “self-respect” was not related to the sexual aggression but was 
added as a general precondition for the duty of respecting others. I will not elaborate on the 
latter point in the following pages. 
As can be seen, the pronoun “we” is used, and there are no “negative forms” such as “it is 
forbidden to” or “we ought not to.” The rationale behind this was to “invite” everyone to act so 
as to respect the rules of the charter, rather than to give the impression of forcing people or 
imposing the rules upon them. The “we” is also used to highlight the fact that the rules were 
decided on collectively and concerned every Indigné. As such, these norms can be seen as 
deontic “we-attitudes”, that reflect the “general will” of the members. Nevertheless, there are 
several vocabulary changes between the two versions of the first rule. The verb “to refuse” 
replaces the verb “to avoid.” There are precise suggestions of what counts as disrespect: 
offenses in regard to race, gender, and sexual orientation. A new rule emerges that concerns the 
right reaction of a third party against disrespect that ought to be fought. 
The written rules are poorer than the final consensus of the previous GA that was itself poorer 
than the collective deliberation. There are no clear mentions of duties of punishing, expelling, 
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or preventing wrongs by any means. But traces of them can be found. Indeed, the verbs “refuse” 
and “fight” can be seen as euphemisms for those duties. Additionally, a clear formulation of the 
duties of acting individually or collectively against an aggression and the aggressor is also 
missing. Nevertheless, the utilization of the “we,” which designates all members, implicitly 
encapsulates those duties. But why are the written rules poorer than the collective deliberation 
in the first place? 
5.2.1. Third stage: writing the rules 
 
There were 14 Indignés during this GA. The only members who were present at the previous 
GA were Edis, Lukas, Lydie, and Armand. The drafting of the first rules took nearly 20 minutes. 
When the revision of the first rules came into discussion, the Indignés took up the final 
consensus that was recorded in the minutes of the November 10th GA. It is important to stress 
that the sentences that figure in the minutes were normative conclusions of the “hot” collective 
deliberation that unfolded during the GA. The verbalized norms and value judgements to which 
the deliberation arrived can be used “coldly” by the members who drafted the rules: there is no 
indication that they felt indignant, contemptuous, or afraid when they did it. But if the 
elaboration of the rules can be made coldly, this does not mean that the Indignés did not feel 
those emotions when drafting the rules. Indeed, taking up the consensual conclusion might have 
reactivated by recall the corresponding emotions in a milder manner. These recalled, low-
intensity emotions (at least as compared to those felt during the 10th November GA) might have 
helped to amend the charter. 
The revision of the charter did not start with the first rule but with those regulating the 
consumption of drugs in the camp. During this discussion, the topic of sanctioning and expelling 
deviants came to the forefront. At this specific moment Lydie and Émilie stated clearly that the 
charter was not a penal code: 
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Lydie: “There’s no sanction, a charter doesn’t sanction people. What you’re suggesting is to 
specify what should be sanctioned and that’s... [...]” 
Émilie: “Exactly what I was about to say. It’s a charter and not penal code.” 
 
Thus they state that the charter must not include rules of sanction. This injunction, which found 
no opposition, constrained the rest of the GA and explains why punishment and exclusion do 
not overtly figure as duties in the charter. When the Indignés finish modifying the rules on 
drugs, Lydie, who is in charge of writing the draft of the charter, demands to revise the first 
rule.  
 
Lydie: “For example, in the first point, it’s super important, ‘We respect others’. Perhaps it would 
be good to put that we prohibit violence of any kind, or something like that, like the consensus we’ve 
reached, so that it’s clear that that’s our first point.” […] 
Émilie (replies to Lydie): “But surely that’s part of respect for others, no?” 
Lydie: “Uh... no. (She laughs, joined by Émilie.) In any case, I think that what’s obvious for us 
isn’t necessarily obvious for others. So, uh, well, I dunno...” 
 
She asks for the proscription of any kind of violence, as was decided in the final consensus. 
Émilie intervenes and says that the interdiction of violence falls under the duty of respecting 
others. She seems to say that the specification of the different types of violence is superfluous. 
But interestingly, Lydie explains that what is evident for them might not be obvious for 
everyone. It seems then that specifying the various forms of disrespect has educational value: 
it brings to the common attention of the members behaviors that ought not to be performed 
because they exemplify disvalues (violence, sexism, racism, etc.). In a sense, this specification 
is also there to “teach” people the extensions of the notions of respect and disrespect; that is, 
what kinds of behaviors fall under these categories. 
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Lukas intervenes and asks to change the verb “to avoid” because it is not strong enough. He 
means that “avoid” makes the rule optional. He wants it to be a categorically imperative and 
reminds the others that the consensus states that violence is not acceptable. 
 
Lukas: “But we used to have a consensus like, uh... OK, we’ll find it in the minutes, but something 
like... uh... what did we say? We... ‘prohibit’? Because it’s not only to avoid, ‘avoid’ is really not 
strong enough.” 
Lydie: “Yea, but that’s it, that has to be changed.” […] 
Lukas: “OK. So there was something, when we were talking about all kinds of violence, there was 
something... Well, in any case, if we absolutely don’t want to put it into the negative, we can find 
something. Though it doesn’t make much difference if it’s ‘prohibit’ or ‘don’t accept’. But anyway.” 
Laetitia: “‘Refuse’? We had something about not accepting any kind of violence whether physical 
or verbal and then something specific about no violence, uh... in particular no... (Armand: ‘Sexual’) 
sexual or racist violence.” 
Armand: “Exactly, we should mention both.” 
A man: “Yea, yea.” 
Laetitia: “If we put ‘we refuse’?” 
Lukas: “Yea.” 
Laetitia: “All forms of violence.” 
 
Laetitia suggests replacing “avoid” by “refuse”; that is an attitude expressing that the Indignés 
do not accept or tolerate violence. This proposal is accepted. “Refuse” is also used as a trick to 
avoid formulating the rule with a negation like “we do not tolerate violence.” Lukas reminds 
the others also that the precise types of disrespect have been chosen: sexual and racial violence. 
Armand agrees with this. 
After having decided how to formulate the interdiction of violence and its condemnation, the 
Indignés move on to the right reaction to violence. Lukas proposes a new paragraph:  
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Lukas: “I’ve got a suggestion for point 3.1. Perhaps a bit radical: ‘We will combat all forms of 
violence’.” 
Lydie: “Yea, yea, yea.” 
Armand: “Yea, with bowling balls.” 
Several people burst out laughing. 
Armand: “No, but you see what I mean. It’s an antimony!” 
The laughter stops. 
Lukas: “As far as I’m concerned, certain forms of violence should be combatted with all the 
necessary means.” 
Lydie: “OK.” 
Laetitia (snickering): “With all the necessary means.” 
 
This time the rule concerns not the type of attitude that the Indignés ought to have when facing 
violence but rather the right behavior to adopt in response to violence. Lukas, who argued in 
the previous GA that violence for punishing the aggressor and for stopping an ongoing 
aggression were legitimate, proposes to add a norm stating, “we will combat all forms of 
violence.” When Armand notes that such a norm contradicts the general banning of all violence, 
Lukas answers that some kinds of violence (in the present case, sexual aggression) can be fought 
by any necessary means, even by violence itself. People in the GA laugh at this proposal and 
do not contest it. Thus the proposal is accepted. As such, the duties of punishing and preventing 
aggression are implicitly captured by the verb “combat,” but they are not explicitly formulated. 
Interestingly, none of the strong pacifists (Juan, Frank, Odile, and Irene) of the previous GA 
are present during this GA. We can hypothesize that if they had been there and a longer 
discussion on this point had taken place, maybe the rule would have been formulated 
differently. It is also interesting to note that the statement that this charter is not a penal code is 
bypassed when it comes to the sexual aggressions: “combat” does not state overtly that 
punishment is a duty but allows it nonetheless. 
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Later on, Lydie, who is writing the rule, asks for help in order to synthesize the proposal. 
Laetitia, Armand and Adrien inform her: 
 
Lydie: “OK... Now just on this point, we have ‘we will avoid insults, judgements and 
discrimination’. Do we want to put an alternative to ‘avoid’?” 
Laetitia: “I say ‘refuse’.” 
Lydie: “‘We refuse’. OK, fine! So, we refuse insults, judgements, discrimination. And then there’s 
also ‘We will combat all verbal or physical violence’. And then there’s the suggestion to specify 
(Émilie: sexual) ‘racial and sexual violence’.” 
Armand: “‘In particular’.” 
Lydie (continues rapidly): “‘In particular’. OK.” 
Armand: “That’s it!” 
Lydie (writing): “‘Sexual and racial’. OK.” 
Adrien: “For discrimination.” 
Armand: “‘Sexual or racial’.” 
 
Lydie writes the consensual formula on a sheet of paper. She is in charge of finishing the 
document and printing the new charter of good conduct. The revision of the first rule is now 
complete.  
6. Discussion 
 
6.1. Empirical discussion 
 
The aim of this paper was to make the case for an affective view of the emergence of norms 
that may help to explain why norms emerge and why they take their specific form and, through 
a study on the emergence of social norms against violence in the context of OGVA. I have thus 
tried to show that those social norms were grounded in the intrinsic norms of indignation, 
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contempt, and fear. During the GAs, those intrinsic norms were discursively verbalized and 
became public objects to be discussed, approved, and collectively adopted by consensus. As 
such, indignation, contempt, and fear were collectively assessed as correct emotions that fitted 
their various objects, but also as socially appropriate emotions that were expected to be felt in 
the face of the events and their authors. Interestingly, the process of emergence was possible 
thanks to the institutional settings of OGVA. Indeed, the GA worked as a “central legislative 
organ” that gave its members the power to make and adopt rules for regulating their interactions, 
thanks to the principles of participatory and deliberative democracy and the procedural norms 
of the GA. But while the “legislative” power was centralized, the “executive” and the 
“judiciary” power remained diffuse and decentralized. Indeed, the “we formulation” of the rules 
commanded that all members, as third parties, had the responsibility to respect the rules and the 
right to punish, prevent, and exclude when the circumstances required it. Thus the collective 
“we attitudes” that emerged during the public deliberation designated for the joint attention of 
the members (Kaufmann, 2010) legitimate objects of indignation, contempt, and fear. But these 
collective attitudes also assigned duties to the members (Kaufmann, 2010): duties of 
condemning violence and of acting against them. Thus the collective elaboration of the norms 
against violence and their formulation in “we” can be seen as an attempt to bring forth a 
sensitive community whose members shared the same concern for the respect of others and 
should have been able to aptly identify disrespect and to adequately react against it thanks to 
the guidance of common rules. As such these rules, setting emotional duties, guiding attention, 
intentional detection, and emotional actions can be understood as emotion rules that emerged 
from the intrinsic norms of the occurrent emotions. Thus the modification of the charter of good 
conduct was an attempt not only to regulate sexual aggressors but also to generate sensitivity 
among members. 
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6.2. Causal and grounding explanations 
 
 
The empirical study of the emergence of norms in OGVA brings us back to the starting 
questions of this paper: why and how do norms emerge? Why do they have their specific forms? 
The answer seems to be that social norms have emotional foundations in both the sense that 
norms emerge from emotions and that types of emotions correspond to types of “forms” 
(Simmel, 1999 [1908]). Just like the empirical study tried to show, norms of punishment for 
wrong, norms of exclusion for unworthiness, and norms of protection against danger were the 
result of indignation, contempt, and fear respectively. That is why I would like to suggest that 
social norms emerge from emotions that “cause” and “ground” them. In that sense, emotions 
provide a “causal explanation” and a “grounding explanation” of the emergence of norms21. 
Indeed, the emotions felt by the members of OGVA, in reaction to emotional events, led them 
to collectively adopt norms: the emotions explain causally the emergence of these norms as the 
result of collective actions. By contrast, the forms of the norms were dependent on the structure 
of the felt emotions. These provide a grounding explanation: emotions give to norms their 
forms in the sense that types of emotions (indignation, contempt, fear), thanks to their intrinsic 
norms, give to types of social norms (punishment, ban, expulsion, protection) their forms. This 
is a relation of “identity dependence”22 where the form of norms depends non-causally upon 
the identity of emotions. But this relation of identity dependence can also be said to obtain in 
virtue of the structure of emotions. The expression in virtue marks the fact that this dependence 
                                                 
21 Aranguren (this volume) develops the idea of emotional mechanism as factors of (re-)production of social 
order The idea that emotions play a causal role in the emergence of social phenomena is already stressed by 
Elster (1999; 2011) who thinks that emotions are “causal mechanisms.” For an application of this idea to social 
movement studies, see Jasper (2014). In a similar way, Barbalet (2001) defends the restricted thesis that basic 
rights are causally and ontologically explained by resentment and vengefulness. 
22 “Identity-dependence” means that  “the identity of x depends on the identity of y” (Tahko and Lowe, Spring 
2015 Edition: p. 17) 
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can be understood as a grounding explanation where emotions ground the norms non-causally 
(Bliss and Trogdon, Winter 2014 Edition), and where emotions are ontologically prior23 to the 
norms (Tahko and Lowe, Spring 2015 Edition), and thus more fundamental than the norms, 
since the norms ontologically depend upon the emotions (Tahko and Lowe, Spring 2015 
Edition).24 
But are causal and grounding explanations compatible? I think so. The causal explanation 
explains how emotional events triggered emotional actions that resulted in the production of 
norms, and the grounding explanation explains which norms (and no others) obtained in virtue 
of their ontological dependency upon the structure of the obtaining emotions (and no others).  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper was dedicated to the empirical study of the emergence of norms against violence in 
the political collective OGVA, and to the theorization of the emotional foundations of norms. I 
have tried to show that the norms that emerged from the group were the result of collective 
indignation, contempt and fear felt by third-parties in relation to two events that have occurred 
in OGVA camp, and that the activists categorized as sexual aggressions. Drawing on this 
empirical study, I have hypothesized that emotions provide causal and grounding explanations 
for the emergence of norms. The central argument dwelled on the thesis that emotions possess 
intrinsic norms (“affective oughts”) that give their forms to extrinsic norms (social norms), and 
in virtue of their action tendencies, emotions can give rise to actions that bring about types of 
                                                 
23 Priority does not have a causal meaning where x is a causal antecedent of y. It expresses “priority between 
things” (Tahko and Lowe, Spring 2015 Edition): x is prior to y, since x is more fundamental than y on a 
grounding hierarchy. 
24 I use Bliss & Trogdon and Tahko & Lowe encyclopedic papers for they clearly synthesize and discuss the 
complex philosophical debates about ontological dependences and grounding explanations. For details about 
“priority” see Fine (2012), and for details about “fundamentality” see Schaffer (2009). The application of the 
“grounding concepts” to emotions and norms comes from me. 
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norms. Thus, types of norms seem to derive from types of emotions. Although I have observed 
and compared different forms of norms, a comparison between norms of the same type is still 
lacking, and further comparisons between different norms are necessary. Thus, comparative 
studies are needed in order to substantiate the thesis that norms have emotional causes and 
foundations. Nevertheless, the theoretical discussion may prove useful for further research on 
the emotional emergence of norms. This empirical study could also be a useful basis for further 
comparative research. 
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